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ABSTRACT
This Article examines recent German court decisions
analyzing Section 10 of the German Patent Act (“PatG”),
which governs cases of contributory patent infringement,
focusing in particular on the implications of recent decisions
on potential cross-border infringement. The Article offers
recommendations on how judicial scrutiny of contributory
infringement in Germany may be streamlined in light of
potential evidentiary problems and concludes with a case
study of how German courts might analyze a situation like
that faced by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in AT&T v. Microsoft.
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INTRODUCTION
The “Funkuhr (Radio Clock) II” decision by the Federal Court of
Justice of Germany (“BGH”) concerned whether supplying a
customer in a different country with a watch work manufactured in
Germany constituted contributory patent infringement (which is
governed by Section 10 of the German Patent Act, or “PatG”) , when
the act at issue did not involve any direct patent infringement (which
is governed by PatG section 9). The decision was reprinted in GRUR
2007, 313 ff., for example, and once again focused the attention of
specialist circles on the PatG provisions regarding contributory patent
infringement, especially in the case of cross-border activities.
Particularly in view of recent developments in international court
decisions on the question of cross-border patent infringement (in the
United States, for example, NTP v. Research in Motion 1 and
especially AT&T v. Microsoft, 2 spring to mind), it is appropriate to
offer a summary review of the consequences of the recent case law on
PatG section 10 with regard to the patent-infringing nature of crossborder activities from the point of view of German legal practice.
It is nevertheless difficult to deal satisfactorily with the field of
contributory patent infringement by cross-border activities without
1

NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) rev'd, 550
U.S. 437, 127 S. Ct. 1746, 167 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2007) and order recalled and
vacated, 227 F. App'x 920 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2
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first—at least briefly—recalling the legal situation regarding direct
patent infringement by cross-border activities, as developed by the
case law on PatG section 9.
I. DIRECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT: PATG SECTION 9
In this context, we should first bear in mind that a link to
Germany is an indispensable prerequisite if there is to be any direct
infringement of a German patent, whether it has been obtained
nationally or via the European Patent Convention (EPC). This is the
case, for example, in the following situations in particular. Let us
assume that an apparatus is manufactured in Germany and is designed
in such a way that there is no patent infringement—for example by
having an additional part fitted that “provisionally” overcomes the
patent-infringing nature of the apparatus, or by the omission of a
particular element that would need to be added to the other parts of
the apparatus to make it patent-infringing. If it is then exported to
another country, where the patent does not apply, and where the
apparatus is then completed in accordance with its intended use in a
form that would constitute patent infringement if used in Germany,
this action amounts to direct patent infringement in Germany. 3
According to the above-mentioned decision, the elements of
infringement are already present even if only the act of offering the
apparatus in a form which is “not yet” patent-infringing occurs in
Germany, at least if the addressee is shown how to make the change
or is clearly aware of the corresponding intended purpose. In this
respect, there is no need to rely on the provisions of PatG section 10,
with its somewhat “jumbled” mixture of objective and subjective
elements, which were only recently the subject of a comprehensive
analysis by Mr. Rauh. 4
As an introductory remark to be borne in mind before turning to
the question of contributory patent infringement by cross-border
activities, it is also interesting to note that the act of offering a
patented item in Germany that is to be delivered from one foreign
3

LG Düsseldorf [Regional Court] 2005, 4 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER
INSTANZGERICHTE ZUM RECHT DES GEISTIGEN EIGENTUMS [INSTGE] 90 (Ger.)
(Infrarot-Messgerät).
4
Rauh GRUR Int. 2008, 293 ff.
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country to another is regarded as a case of direct patent infringement,
as is the act of placing the product in circulation in Germany by
exporting it to another country. 5 The important point to remember
when analysing the above-mentioned case law on PatG section 9 with
regard to cross-border activities, which of course can only be
examined briefly here, is that the act of offering in Germany is at any
rate regarded as an independent use action in its own right, which is
subject to the exclusive rights of the patent proprietor pursuant to
PatG section 9. In other words, if an offer is made to someone in
Germany from another country, or from Germany to someone in
another country, this also constitutes (direct) patent infringement in
Germany, without the need to have recourse to PatG section 10.
There ought to be no doubt in this context that in the entire sphere of
the case law on PatG section 9, an infringing “patented item” is
always understood to be an item that is either covered by the literal
meaning of the claim of the patent in suit or that makes use of the
teaching of the claim, or of one of the independent claims, in an
equivalent manner.
II. CONTRIBUTORY PATENT INFRINGEMENT: PATG SECTION 10
If we now turn to PatG section 10, we find first of all that it
defines a separate element of infringement that is independent of
PatG section 9, 6 namely that of contributory patent infringement.
Third parties are prohibited, without the consent of the patent
proprietor, from offering or supplying means relating to an essential
element of the invention to persons other than those entitled to make
use of the patented invention so that those persons can use the
invention in the purview of the PatG, i.e. in Germany. 7 This
5

Benkard/Scharen, PatG, 10th edition 2006, section 9 no. 40;
Busse/Keukenschrijver, PatG, 6th edition 2003, section 9 no. 133 and 135 with
further references.
6
BGH GRUR 2004, 758, 760 – Flügelradzähler (Impeller Flow Meter);
Busse/Keukenschrijver, PatG, 6th edition 2003, section 10 no. 13;
Kühnen/Geschke, Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der Praxis [The Enforcement
of Patents in Practice], 3rd edition 2008, no. 113; Mes, PatG, 2nd edition 2005,
section 10 no. 1; Osterrieth, Patentrecht, 3rd edition 2007, no. 255;
Schulte/Kühnen, PatG, 8th edition 2008, section 10 no. 5.
7
BGH GRUR 2007, 313, 315 – Funkuhr II; Schulte/Kühnen, PatG, 8th
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prohibition is not unconditional, however, but is subject to the
proviso that certain subjective definitional elements must be present,
which will be discussed below.
The objective definitional elements referred to above, which are
defined in the first part of PatG section 10 para. 1, can be summed up
briefly: when means relating to an essential element of the invention
are offered and supplied in Germany, this act constitutes contributory
patent infringement provided that the subjective definitional elements
which are then defined in PatG section 10 para. 1 are present as well.
A. Defining “Essential Elements” of an Invention
The case law of the BGH has in recent years clarified what are to
be regarded as “essential elements of the invention” for the purposes
of PatG section 10 para. 1. These are either elements contained in the
claim of the patent, or elements that co-operate functionally with such
elements “contained” in the claim. 8 We may refer to the observations
by Peter Meier-Beck on this subject in GRUR 2007, 913 ff.,
especially 917/918.
However, an additional question arises that should not be
disregarded in the context of the present study: what is to be
understood by the statement in the BGH “Flügelradzähler” decision 9
that an element is essential to the invention if it is suitable for cooperating functionally with one or more features of the claim in
implementing the protected inventive idea? In the opinion of this
author, it means that those elements which co-operate functionally
with an element of the invention that is covered by the claim—not
necessarily literally, but possibly only in the context of the equivalent
scope of protection—are also essential elements of the invention and
can thus establish contributory patent infringement in certain
circumstances. 10
edition 2008, section 10 no. 10.
8
BGH GRUR 2004, 758, 761 – Flügelradzähler; BGH GRUR 2005, 848, 849
– Antriebsscheibenaufzug (Driving pulley lift); BGH GRUR 2006, 570, 571 –
extracoronales Geschiebe (Extracoronal attachment).
9
BGH GRUR 2004, 758 – Flügelradzähler.
10
On equivalence, cf.: Busse/Keukenschrijver, PatG, 6th edition 2003, section
10 no. 19; Keukenschrijver, Festschrift 50 Jahre VVP, 2005, pp. 331, 345; Nieder
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B. The Subjective Requirement of PatG Section 10
PatG section 10 requires that in addition to the presence of the
above-mentioned objective definitional elements, namely prohibited
offering or prohibited supplying in Germany in order to use the
invention in Germany, 11 subjective criteria must also be present.
Namely, a third party must know, or it must be obvious on the basis
of the circumstances, that the means concerned are suitable “and
intended” for using the invention 12 (i.e. surely: in Germany! 13).
In the case of “obviousness” as an alternative to “knowledge” by
the third party, the above-mentioned subjective additional
requirement also presupposes that the means concerned are
objectively suitable for being employed in order to use the invention
(in Germany). This implies that any means are covered which are
suitable for using the invention in Germany. As was the case with the
above discussion of the objective definitional elements, this includes
both means which fall within the scope of the literal meaning of the
claim and the elements mentioned there, and those that co-operate
functionally with such elements.
In addition to the elements mentioned in the claim, equivalent
elements must also be taken into account, meaning that those
elements also constitute “prohibited” means because they are
“suitable” for using the invention, in addition to those elements which
are neither included literally in the claim, nor constitute equivalent
modifications of the elements of the claim, but which merely cooperate functionally with such features as a whole for the purposes of
the invention.
In the essay by Rauh, the view is put forward that even the
GRUR 2006, 977, 978; Schramm, Der Patentverletzungsprozess (The Patent
Infringement Trial), 5th edition 2005, chapter 7 no. 37.
11
Kühnen/Geschke, Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der Praxis, 3rd edition
2008, no. 123.
12
BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät; Osterrieth, Patentrecht, 3rd
edition 2007, no. 259.
13
In line with BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät (Air Heater);
Keukenschrijver, FS 50 Jahre VVP, 2005, pp. 331, 337 and 347; Kühnen/Geschke,
Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der Praxis, 3rd edition 2008, no. 123;
Schulte/Kühnen, PatG, 8th edition 2008, section 10 no. 29.

2011]

LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS FEATURE ARTICLE

141

question whether the means concerned are suitable for being
employed in order to use the invention should be included among the
subjective definitional elements, at least to some extent. 14 This can
hardly be the case, however. The decision on that question, namely
the suitability of the means relating to an essential element the
invention for using the invention must be made objectively from the
point of view of the person of average skill in the art at the priority
date of the patent.15
If the elements of contributory patent infringement are to be
present, however, PatG section 10 para. 1 requires not only that the
means referred to must be objectively suitable for being employed in
order to use the invention (in Germany), but also either that the third
party must know of that suitability or that the suitability must be
obvious from the circumstances. 16 This is indeed a subjective
definitional element, disregarding the second alternative of
“obviousness.”
The question occurs to the author whether, whenever means are
objectively suitable for being employed in order to use the invention
in the sense discussed above, a person offering or supplying those
means in Germany (in order to use the invention in Germany) should
not simply be presumed to know that the means concerned are
suitable for being employed in order to use the invention in Germany.
Putting it simply, an obvious move here would be to dispense with
any “subjectivization” of the suitability aspect and instead to adopt
the line of the BGH case law on the question of distinguishing
between the production of something new and repairs in the context
of the discussion of the exhaustion of a patent (as in

14

Rauh GRUR Int. 2008, 293.
Similarly regarding the objective suitability of the means: BGH GRUR
2005, 848, 850 – Antriebsscheibenaufzug; BGH GRUR 2007, 679, 683 –
Haubenstretchautomat (Hood-stretching automat); Busse/Keukenschrijver, PatG,
6th edition 2003, section 10 no. 19; Kühnen/Geschke, Die Durchsetzung von
Patenten in der Praxis, 3rd edition 2008, no. 124; Nieder GRUR 2006, 977, 978;
Nieder, Die Patentverletzung (Patent infringement), 2004, no. 61;
Pierson/Ahrens/Fischer/Ahrens, Recht des geistigen Eigentums (Intellectual
Property Right Law), 2007, p. 87; Scharen GRUR 2001, 995; Schulte/Kühnen,
PatG, 8th edition 2008, section 10 no. 26.
16
BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät.
15
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“Flügelradzähler” 17) and to regard the totality of the “essential
elements” as “obviously” suitable for using the invention. This stance
would render it superfluous to devote any argumentative and,
especially, practical effort to determining the “knowledge” of the
third party with regard to “suitability.”
C. Intention for Use and Knowledge of Intent
The question of something’s being “intended” for using the
invention and of the knowledge thereof will, however, require a
separate examination, which is provided below. What makes this
issue more difficult is that the above-mentioned “intention” is
subjective in the way it deals with the elements, not just in one
respect, but in two. The first decisive point here, as Rauh explains in
detail, 18 is the intention of the recipient of the offer or delivery at the
time of the delivery. 19 One precondition for this first subjective
definitional element, therefore, is that it is “somehow” established
what was going through the mind, as it were, of the recipient of the
offer or delivery at the time of the delivery. 20 In a country like the
Federal Republic of Germany, where there is no “discovery,” except
to a minimal extent, proving such an intention is simply impossible,
in the author’s opinion.
However, even if it can “somehow” be established, or if it can be
assumed “quasi-objectively,” namely according to the intention of the
recipient of the offer or delivery, that the means concerned are
intended for using the invention in Germany, further evidence still
needs to be provided—unless the existence of “obviousness” is
confirmed—since the patent proprietor still has to prove that the third
party offering or supplying in Germany actually knows of the
corresponding quasi-objective “intention for use,” which is based on

17

BGH GRUR 2004, 758 – Flügelradzähler.
Rauh GRUR Int. 2008, 293, 294.
19
BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät; BGH GRUR 2005, 848, 851 –
Antriebsscheibenaufzug.
20
BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät; BGH GRUR 2006, 839,841 –
Deckenheizung (Ceiling heating); BGH GRUR 2007, 679, 684 –
Haubenstretchautomat.
18
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the intention of the recipient of the offer or delivery. 21 This is in
effect the second stage of the process of subjectively determining the
factual elements in accordance with PatG section 10 para. 1. Here
too, we find an insuperable obstacle to furnishing evidence!
D. Presumption of “Obviousness” of Suitability
and Intended Purpose
In order to avoid the difficulties discussed above in establishing
the intended purpose of the means, on the one hand, and in proving
knowledge of the suitability and the intended purpose of the means
concerned, on the other hand, it would be worth considering whether,
in the case of the objective suitability of the means concerned, it
would not be preferable to presume the “obviousness” of the
suitability and the intended purpose. It should be borne in mind in
this context that, on closer inspection, even the term “obviousness”
has both a quasi-objective and a quasi-subjective meaning.
“Objectively,” suitability and an intended purpose are obvious
whenever someone, i.e. the general public, would more or less
inevitably be forced to draw the conclusion, when considering the
overall circumstances, that the means were objectively suitable and
subjectively intended for the illicit use. Adopting a narrower
interpretation of the word “obvious,” which would nevertheless not
involve distorting the wording of PatG section 10, the only decisive
issue would then be whether the suitability or intended purpose were
“obvious” to the third party. At least in this latter, narrower, sense,
there would be no harm, in the opinion of the author, in presuming
this “obviousness” until evidence to the contrary is furnished by the
third party.
Against the background of the fact that offering a patentinfringing apparatus in Germany is already prohibited as an act of
infringement in its own right because it constitutes direct patent
infringement pursuant to PatG section 9, the conclusions already
drawn or to be expected from the case law in connection with
“Funkuhr II” result more or less automatically. If someone offers
21

BGH GRUR 2001, 228, 231 – Luftheizgerät; BGH GRUR 2006, 839, 841 –
Deckenheizung; BGH GRUR 2007, 679, 683 – Haubenstretchautomat.
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means in Germany that relate to an essential element of the invention,
even if it is intended that the means concerned should be supplied to
another country, or (a fortiori!) if he or she supplies those means in
Germany in the—presumed!—knowledge that the means concerned
are objectively suitable for using the invention, and if moreover it is
obvious to the person concerned that the relevant means are intended
to be used in another country (where the patent does not apply), e.g.
to form complete apparatuses which are “patented items” per se, it is
a case of contributory patent infringement. The latter condition
implies that the person making the offer or delivery knows, at the
time of the offer or delivery, that at least the possibility exists that the
items concerned are subsequently (i.e. after the manufacture of the
complete item in the other country where the patent does not apply)
to be offered or otherwise used in Germany.
E. Effects of Actions Taken Outside Germany
As an additional point, it is worth considering the following
situation: the means offered/supplied in Germany in a prohibited
manner are moved to another country, where the patent does not
apply. There, (a) they are “assembled” into patented items that make
use of the patent, and (b) alternatively and according to the sole
intention of the customer, they can be used in such a manner that the
item produced with them in Germany could not establish any patent
infringement under PatG section 9. In this case, i.e. when the means
offered/supplied can be put to a dual use, the third party making the
offer or supplying ought surely to be entitled, as has already been
discussed by various authors, 22 to escape the risk of contributory
patent infringement in Germany by adopting appropriate precautions
in order to prevent the recipient of the corresponding offer or delivery
from using the means offered/supplied in order to use the invention in
material respects.
Much the same must of course apply if it is either obvious from
the circumstances or if the third party making the offer or supplying
can be proven to have manufactured the “patented items” in another
country, where the patent does not apply, using the means
22

Such as Hölder GRUR 2007, 96.
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offered/supplied with the intention of supplying some of them to
Germany, which would then establish the elements of contributory
patent infringement once and for all, while at the same time leaving
others abroad, where the patent does not apply. Suitable approaches
here could range from corresponding instructions to “all and sundry,”
to cautions subject to penalties, depending on the degree of risk that
the infringement will be committed (as far as contributory patent
infringement is concerned), a problem that the BGH has also dealt
with already (as in “Deckenheizung” 23).
Apart from that, it might be noted that the elements of the risk of
contributory patent infringement set forth in PatG section 10, which,
compared to the notion of aiding and abetting with regard to direct
patent infringement—PatG section 9!—are of course intended to
provide the patent proprietor with enhanced protection, 24 will
inevitably remain incomplete as long as it is not possible to dispense
with the need to demonstrate the existence of the subjective
definitional elements under the PatG section 10, para.1 penultimate
and final clauses, which is very difficult to prove,25 if at all.
III. CASE STUDY: AT&T V. MICROSOFT
Finally, against the background discussed above, it could be an
interesting intellectual experiment to consider how the German courts
might decide a situation of the kind underlying the judgment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in AT&T v. Microsoft.26
In that case, Microsoft stored a “master copy” of a software
component on a “golden disc” and sent it abroad. AT&T believed that
this act infringed patent rights in the U.S. The delivery from the U.S.
23

BGH GRUR 2006, 839 – Deckenheizung.
BGH GRUR 1992, 40, 42 – Beheizbarer Atemluftschlauch (Heatable
breathing-air hose); BGH GRUR 2004, 758, 760 – Flügelradzähler; BGH GRUR
2006, 839, 841 – Deckenheizung; Keukenschrijver, FS 50 Jahre VVP, 2005, pp.
331, 336.
25
Positive knowledge is difficult to argue and prove, cf. BGH GRUR 2005,
848, 851 – Antriebsscheibenaufzug; Benkard/Scharen, PatG, 10th edition 2006,
section 10 no. 18; Kühnen/Geschke, Die Durchsetzung von Patenten in der Praxis,
3rd edition 2008, no. 135; Schramm, Der Patentverletzungsprozess, 5th edition
2005, chapter 7 no. 40; Schulte/Kühnen, PatG, 8th edition 2008, section 10 no. 30.
26
U.S. CAFC GRUR Int. 2005, 948 – AT&T v. Microsoft.
24
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to another country (e.g. Germany …!) was clearly made with the
intention that further copies should be made there, and that these
should then in the other country be “integrated” into appropriate
computers.
The situation to be judged in the U.S. was decided with § 271 (f)
of the U.S. Patent Code in mind, 27 a provision which prohibits
supplying unauthorized components of an invention which is patented
(in the U.S.) from the U.S. to another country in the knowledge that
the components will be used in that other country in a way that would
constitute patent infringement in the U.S. There is of course no such
regulation in Germany, but it is intersting to consider how the legal
situation would have to be judged in the light of the German case law
on PatG section 10.
First of all, it can be assumed—and this corresponds to the
analysis of the facts by the U.S. court of first instance and by the
Federal Circuit—that the software concerned, whether it was sent
abroad on a “golden master disc” or by electronic means, was a
“component” of the computer to be manufactured abroad, consisting
of hardware components and precisely the above-mentioned software
component.
If the corresponding software component had been manufactured
in Germany and sent from Germany to another country, where the
patent did not apply, it is the author’s opinion that this would
certainly constitute a means supplied in Germany with the objective
suitability for use in a complete apparatus consisting of hardware and
software, which would be assembled abroad. The objective
definitional elements of PatG section 10 should thus be regarded as
present. In addition, considering the analysis of the facts by the
Federal Circuit, the situation would have been that the person
offering the software in the Federal Republic of Germany or
supplying it to another country from there would have known that the
invention was to be employed abroad in order to use the invention, so
that, once the necessary connection with Germany had been
established, this would have led to direct patent infringement in
Germany. In this case relating to Germany, the software supplier
would therefore have been aware of the objective suitability and also,
27

U.S. CAFC GRUR Int. 2005, 948 – AT&T v. Microsoft.
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compounding his guilt, would have known that the recipient abroad
intended to use the software component in a complete apparatus
which would have infringed the patent as a whole in Germany.
Considering PatG section 10, if the entire situation were
“transposed” from the U.S. to Germany, it would then be necessary to
examine whether the “complete apparatuses” assembled abroad,
consisting of hardware and software, were expected to be offered or
supplied in/to Germany according to their intended use, at least in
part. Obviously, this would undoubtedly be the case if no reliable
restriction were placed on the distribution of the “complete
apparatuses,” which was not claimed in the U.S. anyway.
Ultimately, one arrives at the conclusion that there has been
contributory patent infringement in Germany, involving the
corresponding entitlements to a cease-and-desist order and claims to
damages on the part of the patent proprietor (AT&T), and the fact
that copies of the “master copy” of the software might have been
made in the other country, which could have infringed territorial
copyright and patent rights even before they were installed in
countless complete apparatuses, would not alter the fact of
contributory patent infringement in any way.
In this latter connection, it is incidentally difficult to understand
why Judge Rader, who delivered a dissenting opinion in the abovementioned judgment by the Federal Circuit, could take the view that
something could not be regarded as infringing a patent in the U.S.
(because of § 271 (f) USPC) if legal action could also be taken
against it there according to local law, i.e. on the grounds of patent
and/or copyright infringement. 28
CONCLUSION
As the reader will realize, as far as cross-border activities of a
certain kind are concerned, PatG section 10 achieves an effect for the
benefit of the patent proprietor that is certainly comparable to that of
§ 271 (f) USPC. This would at any rate be the case if, as far as the
“obviousness test” were concerned, greater emphasis were placed in
the sense suggested above on presuming at least subjective
28

U.S. CAFC GRUR Int. 2005, 948, 950 – AT&T v. Microsoft.
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obviousness of the intended use, or knowledge of the item’s
suitability/intention for that use, which would act to the disadvantage
of the third party, and thus to the advantage of the patent proprietor.

